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China,	1911	-1945	(originally	published	by	Macmillan	in	1970	but	quoted	from	the	2001	edition	published	by	Phoenix	Press,	page	132).	This	note	is	to	clarify	any	confusion	that	may	arise	regarding	this	citation.	36	Ott,	Vietnam	Studies:	Field	Artillery,	1953-1973,	21.	37	Fall, Street Without Joy, 318 and 323-324.	38	Joseph	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2	(London:	Pall	Mall	Press,	1967),	824.	
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placed	at	the	feet	of	the	French	Commander-in-Chief,	the	northern	theater	commander,	and	the	fortress	commander.39	In	fact,	the	fortress	artillery	chief,	Colonel	Piroth,	was	the	first	to	understand	the	“fatal	error,”	and	killed	himself	during	the	battle	with	a	grenade	after	apologizing	to	those	around	him	for	the	failure.40	In	contrast	with	the	French	artillery	placement,	the	DRV	forces	were	perfectly	placed.	Mountains	that	the	French	and	other	military	advisors	believed	would	be	insurmountable	with	any	type	of	artillery	surrounded	the	French	base	at	Dien	Bien	Phu.	They	had	chosen	this	position	because	of	the	airfield,	which	allowed	easy	access	for	supplies	and	soldiers.	The	DRV,	cognizant	of	the	hazardous	terrain,	were	nevertheless	able	to	bring	their	artillery	up	into	the	mountains	and	surround	the	French,	digging	into	the	mountain	to	provide	ideal	cover	and	concealment	for	that	artillery.	The	result	was	that	the	DRV	forces	could	deploy	their	artillery	in	an	effective	circle	around	the	French	base,	firing	down	on	the	French	with	minimal	risk	to	DRV	forces,	whereas	the	French	artillery	had	very	little	ability	to	strike	back	and	neutralize	the	threat.	Once	the	attack	from	the	DRV	forces	was	underway,	the	French	had	begun	to	realize	that	Dien	Bien	Phu	was	their	last	stand.	The	Fourth	Republic’s	dreams	of	the	French	Union	were	quickly	being	undone.41	Knowing	that	the	Geneva	Conference	was	taking	place	in	a	few	weeks,	the	French	decided	to	make	a	final	diplomatic	effort	to	prevent	a	disaster.	The	US	Ambassador	to	Vietnam,	Donald	Heath,	was	deeply	concerned	with	the	situation,	and	believed	that	conflict	in	some	form	would	continue	until	the	Vietnamese	people	were	independent	of	France.	At	the	same	time,	the	United	States	Ambassador	to	France,	C.	Douglas	Dillon,	argued	in	Washington	that	the	Vietnamese	were	at	fault	and	that	the	United	States	should	not	do	anything	to	undermine	the	French.42																																																									
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Reader:	Articles	and	Documents	on	American	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Vietnam	
Crisis,	eds.	Raskin	and	Fall,	96-97.	
	 185	
administration	knew	that	the	French	were	losing	their	will	to	fight,	and	while	his	government	was	ardently	anti-communist,	they	were	also	firmly	nationalist.	They	feared	that	the	Conference	would	think	that	the	French,	in	their	desire	to	withdraw	with	some	semblance	of	dignity,	would	ignore	their	wishes	completely	and	make	a	deal	directly	with	the	DRV	and	the	Viet	Minh,	abandoning	the	South	Vietnamese.	The	reason	this	was	so	risky	for	Bao	Dai’s	government	was	that	its	political,	and	potentially	literal,	survival	was	dependent	on	an	external	ally	for	some	form	of	Military	Intervention,	which	had	been	Military	Aid	and	Military	Support,53	though	not	in	the	traditional	sense.	That	these	would	be	an	ancillary	concern	was	the	primary	reason	for	Bao	Dai’s	government’s	resistance	to	the	Geneva	Conference.54	This	became	relevant	since	the	Republic	of	Vietnam’s	government	felt	no	ownership	of	either	the	process	or	the	outcome.	These	well-found	fears	became	reality.	The	French	saw	the	partition	as	a	way	for	them	to	withdraw	with	some	honor	intact;	the	Soviets,	Chinese,	and	Viet	Minh	were	all	pleased	because	they	knew	that	with	continued	support,	the	Viet	Minh	and	the	DRV	would	eventually	be	able	to	conquer	the	remaining	part	of	the	south	that	was	not	under	their	control,	and	that	the	French	would	no	longer	be	a	part	of	the	military	equation.55	The	continuing	conversation	during	the	Geneva	conference	between	Eden	and	Prime	Minister	Churchill	was	a	recognition	that	the	United	States,	through	Secretary	Dulles,	wanted	to	escalate	the	situation	in	Indochina,	and	the	British	were	increasingly	uninterested	in	going	along.56	As	Dulles	wrote	Eisenhower,	“UK	attitude	is	one	of	increasing	weakness.	British	seem	to	feel	that	we	are	disposed	to	accept	present	risks	of	a	Chinese	war	and	this,	coupled	also	with	their	fear	that	we	would	start	using	atomic	weapons,	has	badly	frightened	them.”57																																																									
53	As	previously	discussed,	the	French,	prior	to	the	Geneva	Conference,	would	not	allow	Military	Aid	to	be	given	directly	to	the	Vietnamese	people,	even	their	allies.	54	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2,	834.	55	James	Cable,	The	Geneva	Conference	of	1954	on	Indochina	(London:	Macmillan	Press	Ltd,	1986),	61-65.	56	Ibid.	57	John	Foster	Dulles,	“Telegram	to	President	Eisenhower,”	in	Foreign	Relations	of	
the	United	States,	1952–1954,	The	Geneva	Conference,	Volume	XVI,	eds.	Allen	H.	
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The	relevance	of	this	entire	focus	on	the	1954	Geneva	Conference	to	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Vietnam	is	that	this	issue	set	up	the	entire	mission	for	failure.	Because	the	local	government	had	not	bought	into	the	Conference	and	the	resulting	partition,	they	did	not	feel	obligated	to	follow	through	on	the	commitments	made	on	their	behalf.	This	resulted	in	a	disastrous	situation,	when,	after	consolidating	power	for	two	years,	President	Diem	(previously	appointed	Prime	Minister	in	1954	under	Bao	Dai),	purposefully	declined	to	hold	free	elections	in	1956	as	agreed	to	at	the	Geneva	Conference.	His	argument	declared	that	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	now	a	sovereign	state,	and	therefore	was	not	bound	by	a	treaty	signed	by	a	foreign	power,	France,	on	its	behalf,58	exacerbating	an	already	tense	political	situation	locally.	The	result	of	this	situation	was	that	there	were	multiple	constituencies	vying	for	power,	playing	the	French	off	the	Americans	and	vice	versa.	The	political	will	in	the	South	Vietnamese	ruling	class	was	not	one	that	accepted	a	long-term	sustainable	political	resolution	to	the	conflict,	as	much	as	it	aimed	to	gather	enough	power	and	wealth	for	itself,	resulting	in	a	military	coup	in	1963.	As	a	result,	there	were	no	legitimate	political	partners	for	the	United	States	to	work	with	to	establish	a	long-term	political	objective	so	that	the	Military	Assistance	mission	could	meet	a	long-term	goal,	there	being	no	long-term	goal.	Without	political	partnership,	there	was	no	possibility	for	any	military	to	achieve	a	long-term,	sustainable	security	through	any	kind	of	military	operation,	including	Military	Assistance.	On	the	international	side,	Secretary	Dulles	managed	to	both	fail	to	develop	a	partnership	of	an	ally,	the	British,	while	at	the	same	time	committing	to	the	strategy	of	containing	Global	Communism	when	there	was	no	clarity	that	the	United	States	had	the	ability	or	resources	to	achieve	such	a	significant	goal.	This	inconsistency	would	affect	the	Military	Assistance	mission’s	beginnings	and	goals.																																																									Kitchens	and	Neal	H.	Petersen	(Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Government	Printing	Office,	1981),	Document	378,	accessed	December	5,	2016,	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/d378.	Originally	in	Cable,	The	Geneva	Conference,	65.	58	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	343-348.	
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The	Origins	of	Military	Assistance	in	Vietnam	While	there	was	some	ongoing	activity	between	of	the	DRV	and	Viet	Minh	leaders	with	the	Office	of	Strategic	Services	(OSS),	the	forerunner	to	the	CIA,	during	WWII,	the	establishment	of	the	Military	Assistance	Program	did	not	begin	until	1950.	The	initial	effort	of	Military	Intervention	came	in	the	form	of	a	Military	Aid	request,	which	was	characterized	“as	modest	and	appropriate	in	view	of	the	military	situation	in	Vietnam.”59	However,	as	military	historian	Robert	Spector	stated,	“military	leaders	earlier	had	viewed	Southeast	Asia	as	important	chiefly	because	of	its	relationship	to	the	island	chain	of	Japan,	Okinawa,	Taiwan,	and	the	Philippines,	the	Joint	Chiefs	now	[in	1950]	saw	Southeast	Asia	as	strategically	important	in	its	own	right.”60	
The	Joint	Chiefs’	of	Staff	Strategic	Shift	Although	the	reasons	why	the	Joint	Chiefs	made	such	a	strategic	shift	is	not	germane	to	this	research	project,	the	point	is	that	they	did,	and	the	ramifications	of	this	strategic	transition	are	germane	to	this	research	project.	It	very	likely	could	have	been	the	general	view	that	many	in	the	West	had,	seeing	Communism	as	a	monolithic	movement,	there	being	no	difference	between	Stalin	and	Mao	in	their	minds,	no	matter	that	both	deeply	mistrusted	one	another,	especially	after	the	Korean	War.	Perceiving	a	monolithic	communist	movement	that	was	expanding	across	the	Asian	continent	had	to	be	a	concern.	Their	suspicions	could	only	have	been	confirmed	a	few	months	later,	when	North	Korea	launched	a	surprise	attack	on	the	unprepared	South	Korea,	pushing	allied	forces	to	the	sea.	Articulating	their	views	in	the	memorandum,	the	Joint	Chiefs	stated,	“With	respect	to	the	measures	which,	from	the	United	States	military	point	of	view,	might	be	taken	to	prevent	Communist	expansion	in	Southeast	Asia,	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	recommend	early	implementation	of	military	aid	programs	for	Indochina,	Indonesia,	Thailand,	the	Philippines,	and	Burma.”61	
																																																								
59	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	105.	60	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	107.	61	Omar	Bradley,	“Memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense:	Strategic	Assessment	of	Southeast	Asia,”	April	10,	1950,	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	
	 188	
This	is	germane	for	examining	the	failures	made	by	senior	leaders	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance	in	Vietnam.	This	memorandum	outlines	the	first	recommendation	by	military	leaders	to	the	civilian,	political	leadership	to	formalize	a	Military	Aid	and	Military	Assistance	program.	The	problem	with	the	Joint	Chiefs’	recommendation	is	that	it	lacked	a	connection	to	any	political	objective.	Certainly,	prevention	of	the	spread	of	communism,	the	domino	theory,	is	a	political	objective;	however,	the	disconnect	is	that	the	Joint	Chiefs,	like	many,	had	a	monolithic	view	of	Communism	—	that	what	was	happening	from	a	policy	side	in	the	Soviet	Union	was	having	a	clear	manifestation	in	Southeast	Asia.	Although	there	is	little	question	that	there	was	an	inherent	relationship,	at	this	point	there	was	poor	connection	to	the	underlying	reasons	of	pursuit.	Whereas	in	Russia,	Communism	came	to	fruition	due	to	class	and	economic	disconnects,	in	Southeast	Asia	there	existed	the	belief	that	the	Capitalist	West	intended	colonial	interests	and	prevention	of	local	governance.	In	pursuit	of	Grand	Strategy,	there	was	the	argument	to	contain	the	global	spread	of	Communism;	however,	the	advice	of	George	Kennan	to	initially	pursue	the	policy	of	containment	where	it	was	feasible	had	not	been	heeded.	The	Joint	Chiefs	were	mindful,	in	the	memorandum,	about	expenses,	and	made	a	clear	budget	request	for	the	fiscal	year;	however,	in	1950	there	had	been	no	in-depth	study	of	resource	input	versus	outputs.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	this	was	the	beginning	of	the	gradual	escalation	that	seemed	to	feature	prominently	in	planning	during	the	entire	period	that	the	United	States	was	active	in	Vietnam,	but	more	concerning	was	the	Joint	Chiefs	themselves.	All	the	Joint	Chiefs	—	General	of	the	Army	Omar	Bradley	as	Chairman,	General	Clifton	Cates	as	Commandant	of	the	Marine	Corps,	Admiral	Forrest	Sherman	as	Chief	of	Naval	Operations,	General	Hoyt	Vandenberg	as	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Air	Force,	and	Lawton	Collins	as	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Army	—	had	extensive	war	records,	having	served	in	combat	during	both	WWI	and	WWII.	In	addition	to	their	extensive	war	records,	all	were	part	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	during	the	first	part	of	the	Korean	War,	so	the	natural	question	to	ask	is	how	one																																																									Section	B,	Subpart	2(b),	310.	Originally	referenced	in	Spector,	Advice	and	
Support:	The	Early	Years,	107.	
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Military	Assistance	mission	came	to	become	so	successful	while	this	one	was	clearly	not.	One	difference	was	in	the	wars	themselves.	In	the	Korean	War,	there	was	an	immediate	full	spectrum	engagement,	while	in	Vietnam	there	was	a	gradual	escalation.	The	problem	with	this	answer,	however,	is	twofold.	First,	in	the	Korean	War,	as	noted	in	Chapter	4,	the	Joint	Chiefs	thought	that	Brigadier	General	Roberts	and	the	KMAG	had	done	a	poor	job	in	preparing	the	Republic	of	Korea	(ROK)	Army	for	combat	against	the	Communist	North.62	This	view	caused	the	KMAG	to	be	essentially	ignored,	but	for	ROK	President	Syngman	Rhee	giving	command	and	control	of	the	ROK	Army	to	General	MacArthur,	until	the	KMAG	was	able	to	prove	its	worth	by	assisting	in	the	replacement	and	development	of	many	ROK	Army	officers.	Furthermore,	the	policy	regarding	corrupt	or	inept	officers	being	replaced	must	also	have	impacted	the	overall	outcome	of	the	conflict.	In	addition,	the	Korean	War	more	clearly	resembled	the	wars	of	the	Joint	Chiefs’	pasts,	in	that	it	was	a	war	with	clear	battle	lines	and	military-on-military	maneuvers,	attacks,	and	counterattacks.	In	contrast,	the	war	that	was	being	fought	in	Vietnam	was	one	of	counterinsurgency	and	the	perception	by	the	local	populace	that	the	United	States	had	intentions	to	reassert	foreign	rule.	The	second	reason	is	that	none	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	would	remain	in	their	positions	much	longer.	General	Cates	would	leave	in	1951,	Admiral	Sherman	died	that	year,	and	Generals	Vandenberg,	Collins,	and	Bradley	would	all	leave	in	1953.	Who	is	to	know	what	they	would	have	decided	in	later	years	if	they	had	been	in	the	same	positions,	and	whether	they	would	have	pushed	back	against	Secretary	Dulles’	desire	to	expand	the	nature	of	the	containment	of	the	perceived	communist	threat?	In	this	regard,	there	was	an	inherent	flaw	in	the	system.	Significantly,	the	system	at	that	time	did	not	require	strategic	review	or	long-term	planning.	Indeed,	while	this	1950	memorandum	to	Secretary	of	Defense	Johnson	is	termed	a	“Strategic	Assessment,”	rather	than	an	actual	strategic	assessment,	it	became	more	of	a	situational	assessment.	The	difference	is	that	
																																																								
62	Bryan	R.	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win:	American	Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	1946–
1953	(Tuscaloosa:	The	University	of	Alabama	Press,	2012),	7	and	9.	
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the	memorandum	examined	the	situation	in	Southeast	Asia	but	reviewed	very	little	of	the	strategic	dynamics	at	work.	In	addition,	there	is	no	related	analysis,	but	a	wholehearted	embracing	of	the	domino	theory	when	the	memo	states,	“The	fall	of	Indochina	would	undoubtedly	lead	to	the	fall	of	the	other	mainland	states	of	Asia.”63	This	declaration	was	made	years	before	President	Eisenhower	would	similarly	articulate	the	issue.	The	relevance	of	this	is	to	ask	whether	there	was,	in	fact,	a	structural	problem	regarding	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	in	that	each	Chief	would	only	serve	approximately	four	years	and	as	such,	would	be	unable	to	assess	and	reassess	their	strategic	decisions,	or	whether	simply	a	tragic	mistake	was	made	by	extraordinarily	competent	and	experienced	men.	However,	there	was	a	reversal	of	the	underlying	dynamics	of	the	Joint	Chiefs,	although	not	a	change	in	policy.	About	a	year	after	the	Strategic	Assessment	memorandum	was	written,	Truman,	on	the	advice	of	the	same	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	relieved	MacArthur	from	command	of	United	Nations	Forces	in	Korea.	In	May	of	1951,	Bradley	was	asked	to	testify	at	a	joint	Senate	committee	composed	of	the	Committees	on	Armed	Services	and	Foreign	Relations	on	the	circumstance	around	the	relief	of	MacArthur.	General	Bradley	represented	the	thoughts	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	regarding	the	broader	situation	of	the	Korean	War,	stating,	“Under	present	circumstances,	we	[the	Joint	Chiefs]	have	recommended	against	enlarging	the	war.	The	course	of	action	often	described	as	‘limited	war’	with	Red	China	would	increase	the	risk	we	are	taking	by	engaging	too	much	of	our	power	in	an	area	that	is	not	the	critical	strategic	prize.”64	In	this	case	the	Joint	Chiefs	were	articulating	need	for	a	limited	war	of	the	“limited	war,”	that	is,	to	narrow	the	military	focus	of	the	Korean	War	to	achieve	the	political	objective	of	a	limited	containment	of	Communism.	Bradley	continued	to	make	his	now	infamous	statement,	“Red	China	is	not	a	powerful	nation	seeking	to	dominate	the	world.	Frankly,	in	the	opinion	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	this	strategy	would	involve	us																																																									
63	Bradley,	“Memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense,”	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	Section	B,	Subpart	2(b),	309.	64	Omar	N.	Bradley,	“Testimony,”	May	15,	1951,	United	States	Senate,	Committee	on	Armed	Forces	and	the	Committee	on	Foreign	Relations,	Military	Situation	in	
the	Far	East,	hearings,	82d	Congress,	1st	session,	part	2	(Washington,	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1951),	731.	
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in	the	wrong	war,	at	the	wrong	place,	at	the	wrong	time,	and	with	the	wrong	enemy.”65	This	was	all	unfolding	while	at	the	same	time	there	was	gradual	escalation	of	commitment	to	French	Indochina,	and	at	no	point	did	the	Joint	Chiefs	state	that	the	conflict	in	Indochina	threatened	to	expand	throughout	Southeast	Asia.	However,	the	1950	Strategic	Assessment	memorandum	from	the	Joint	Chiefs	requests	the	development	of	Military	Aid	programs	throughout	the	region.	In	addition,	while	there	was	no	way	to	know	how	these	military	leaders	would	have	changed	and	evolved	in	their	thinking,	or	not,	had	they	continued	in	their	positions	as	Joint	Chiefs,	Bradley’s	views	are	in	fact	known.	Bradley,	after	his	retirement	from	active	service	in	1954,66	continued	to	give	advice	on	the	Vietnam	conflict	to	President	Johnson	as	part	of	an	informal	group	called	the	Wise	Men.	Bradley	stood	out	as	one	member	in	1968,	after	the	Tet	Offensive,	who	continued	to	advise	that	military	escalation	continue.67	The	question	again,	then,	is	how	could	there	be	such	a	divergence	in	results	between	the	wars	and	their	relation	to	Military	Assistance?	The	difference	in	results	is	much	the	same	with	respect	to	both	the	wars	and	the	Military	Assistance,	and	ultimately	has	to	do	with	a	foundation	of	Liberal	international	relations	theory,	which	is	based	on	partnerships	and	international	cooperation.	The	evolving	situation	in	Indochina	could	not	develop	government	that	was	considered	as	legitimate	in	the	eyes	of	the	population.	The	French	were	viewed	as	invaders	and	colonial	occupiers,	and	after	the	loss	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	viewed	as	a	personal	fiefdom	of	Prime	Minister,	later	
																																																								
65	Bradley,	“Testimony,”	May	15,	1951,	United	States	Senate,	Military	Situation	in	
the	Far	East,	hearings,	82d	Congress,	1st	session,	part	2,	732.	66	“American	officers	holding	five-star	rank	[technically]	never	retire.	They	draw	full	active	duty	pay	for	the	remainder	of	their	lives,	although	after	a	certain	point	their	actual	military	duties	and	responsibilities	become	minimal.”	David	T.	Zabecki,	“Military	Ranks,”	in	The	Encyclopedia	of	the	Vietnam	War,	Second	
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President,	Ngo	Dinh	Diem	and	his	family.	After	Diem’s	overthrow	and	assignation	in	November	1963	by	a	military	junta,	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	ruled	by	a	succession	of	military	leaders	—	all	of	whom	failed	in	varying	degrees.	For	the	United	States,	there	was	no	legitimate	government	to	partner	with	throughout	the	war	with	which	it	could	engage	on	a	broader	political	objective.	In	addition,	after	the	French	left	Indochina	due	to	the	negotiated	settlement	at	the	1954	Geneva	Conference,	and	the	United	States	took	on	more	and	more	of	the	burden	of	the	Vietnam	conflict,	there	was	not	the	same	sense	of	international	cooperation	as	there	had	been	in	the	Korean	War.	This	was	due	to	Truman’s	taking	advantage	of	the	lack	of	Soviet	Union	participation	in	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	and	securing	broad,	global	support	against	the	clear	aggression	of	the	DPRK.	In	contrast,	due	to	the	continuing	challenges	of	any	clear	political	objective	in	the	Vietnam	conflict,	there	existed	far	less	of	an	international	presence	in	the	combat	force,	with	so	few	nations	contributing	that	the	effort	was	more	of	a	regional	security	effort.	Interestingly,	a	young	Colin	Powell	saw	this	first-hand,	and	made	certain	that	the	concept	of	broad,	international	involvement	was	a	cornerstone	of	future	engagements	for	which	he	would	be	responsible	during	his	service	in	Vietnam,	forming	the	important	tenet	of	the	Powell	Doctrine	as	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	Given	the	wide	ramifications	of	the	Vietnam	conflict,	these	moments	may	seem	insignificant	or	trivial	at	best,	but	they	all	point	to	tremendously	important	fundamentals	of	Military	Assistance.	It	is	clear	from	the	Joint	Chief’s	memorandum	that	there	was	an	intent	to	have	an	established	Military	Assistance	mission	in	what	would	become	Vietnam	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	involvement.	That	Military	Assistance	mission	was	never	properly	linked	to	a	political	objective,	something	of	which	senior	military	leaders	such	as	the	Joint	Chiefs	were	certainly	aware,	taking	Bradley’s	comments	about	“Red	China”	in	his	Congressional	testimony	into	account.	The	Failure	of	the	Military	Assistance	Mission	While	the	shift	in	thinking	by	the	Joint	Chiefs	happened	prior	to	the	beginning	of	the	Korean	War,	the	change	in	approaches	for	the	Military	Assistance	mission	happened	after	the	Battle	Dien	Bien	Phu,	as	the	French	withdrew,	and	the	United	
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States	became	more	involved	in	the	Republic	of	Vietnam.	MAAG	Indochina	had	been	formed	due	to	the	recommendations	in	the	Joint	Chiefs’	memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense	on	April	10,	1950.	MAAG	Indochina	was	specifically	designed	as	a	small	unit	to	keep	track	of	equipment	and	money	from	the	United	States	to	the	French	and	French	Union	soldiers,	but	this	became	a	challenge	due	to	efforts	by	political	leaders	to	expand	the	influence	of	the	United	States	in	Indochina.	The	first	commander	of	MAAG	Indochina,	Brigadier	General	Francis	Brink,	who	commanded	from	the	fall	of	1950	to	the	summer	of	1952,	had	a	disagreement	with	the	newly	installed	head	of	the	State	Department	run	Economic	Cooperation	Administration,	Robert	Blum.	Blum,	along	with	the	State	Department	for	which	he	distributed	economic	aid,	thought	that	given	the	level	of	financial	commitment	the	United	States	was	making,	it	should	be	afforded	more	influence	over	the	military	affairs	in	Indochina,	and	directly	train	the	Vietnamese	rather	than	the	French	training	the	Vietnamese.	Brink	and	much	of	his	team,	disagreed,	believing	that	to	properly	resource	such	a	change	in	the	military	mission	would	require	over	4,000	soldiers.68	This	break	between	the	understanding	of	the	political	leadership	in	the	form	of	the	State	Department	and	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	responsible	for	carrying	out	their	agenda	would	not	be	the	first	such.	In	this	case,	many	Washington,	D.C.	leaders	must	have	misunderstood	the	reports	being	filed	by	MAAG	Indochina,	which	the	Washington,	D.C.	based	leaders	believed	were	positive.	This	is	in	direct	contrast	to	MAAG	Indochina’s	actual	statements	reporting	a	lack	of	understanding	or	training	on	American-made	equipment,	with	the	Vietnamese	Navy’s	readiness	even	worse.	These	challenges	culminated	in	Brink’s	suicide	while	in	Washington	D.C.	in	July	1952.	He	was	replaced	by	a	commander	from	the	Korean	War,	Brigadier	General	Thomas	Trapnell,	who	provided	a	youthful	enthusiasm.	He	quickly	sobered,	having	deep	concern	with	
																																																								
68	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	155.	
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the	French	and	their	inability	to	properly	incorporate	the	Vietnamese	soldiers	into	their	efforts.69	The	experience	of	Brink	highlights	a	frequent	challenge	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	has	had	with	political	leadership	with	respect	to	military	operations	and	Military	Assistance	more	specifically,	which	is	appropriately	linking	resources	with	objectives.	This	has	been	seen	in	Brink’s	being	refused	resources	for	the	change	in	training	the	Vietnamese,	Defense	Secretary	Les	Aspin	turning	down	a	request	for	armored	vehicles	to	be	used	in	the	Somali	raid	in	1993	(popularized	by	the	book,	Black	Hawk	Down),70	and	General	Shinseki’s	testimony	stating	the	need	for	far	more	soldiers	than	had	been	planned	to	conquer	and	hold	Iraq.71	There	is	a	natural	“tug-of-war”	that	occurs	between	policymakers	and	operators,	with	operators	asking	for	more	and	policymakers	wanting	or	being	constrained,	making	it	necessary	to	give	less,	either	due	to	expense	or	the	political	challenges	of	having	a	heavy	military	footprint	in	the	respective	country.	This	tug-of-war	has	beneficial	results,	in	that	it	demonstrates	that	each	profession	is	acting	in	accordance	with	how	they	are	required	to	function	to	achieve	their	respective	goals.	The	fundamental	challenge,	however,	is	one	of	contingencies.	In	all	military	operations,	from	the	smallest	Military	Aid	mission,	such	as	MAAG	Indochina	when	it	was	conceived,	to	the	largest	scale	battles	such	as	Operation	Overlord	in	WWII,	there	is	one	question	that	must	always	be	asked:	What	happens	if	every	assumption	being	made	is	wrong?	This	is	a	question	ultimately	of	risk	for	both	policymakers	and	military	leaders.	Brink	and	his	staff	had	clearly	made	the	assessment	that	given	the	dynamics	in	Indochina	at	the	time,	especially	given	the	complications	of	dealing	with	the	French,	it	would	be	a																																																									
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mistake	to	pursue	a	more	extensive	Military	Assistance	mission.	This	was	an	assessment	that	General	Shinseki	had	been	able	to	make	with	respect	to	the	Iraq	invasion,	and	that	Secretary	Aspin	had	not	been	able	to	make	with	respect	to	the	Somali	raid.72	This	is	exactly	the	set	of	challenges	and	issues	that	would	greet	Lieutenant	General	John	O’Daniel	when	taking	command	of	MAAG	Indochina	in	April	of	1954.	O’Daniel	was	considered	a	top	field	commander,	having	served	in	WWI	and	WWII	with	distinction,	but	his	experience	in	Vietnam	was	less	stellar,	highlighted	by	his	declaration	that	it	was	not	possible	that	the	French	base	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	would	fall.	In	a	report	to	the	Joint	Chiefs,	he	stated,	“I	feel	that	it	[Dien	Bien	Phu]	can	withstand	any	kind	of	an	attack	that	the	Viet	Minh	are	capable	of	launching.	However,	a	force	with	two	or	three	battalions	of	medium	artillery	with	air	observation	could	make	the	area	untenable.	The	enemy	does	not	seem	to	have	this	capability	at	present.”73	It	was	also	clear	from	the	report	that	the	French	remained	uninterested	in	involving	the	United	States	in	Indochina	affairs	that	the	French	regarded	as	internal,	while	at	the	same	time	the	Vietnamese	were	extremely	anxious	for	more	assistance	from	the	United	States.74	It	is	important	to	note	that	MAAG	Indochina	in	1954	remained	a	unit	focused	on	tracking	Military	Aid.	After	the	French	defeat	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	and	the	subsequent	negotiations	at	the	Geneva	Conference	culminating	in	the	Geneva	Accords,	with	the	formal	division	of	Indochina	into	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam,	MAAG	Indochina	was	renamed	MAAG	Vietnam	and	placed	under	the	command	of	Lieutenant	General	Samuel	Williams.	Here	was	a	unique	officer	in	that,	after	having	been	fired	from	his	position	as	a	general	officer	during	combat																																																									
72	The	Somali	raid	offers	an	interesting	example	of	a	military	operation	in	which	the	political	goals	were	both	achievable	and	clearly	defined,	and	yet	the	operation	still	went	poorly.	This	relates	back	to	risk	and	a	lack	of	risk	analysis,	in	that	there	was	no	serious	consideration	of	what	could	happen,	or	in	military	planning	parlance,	what	was	the	enemy’s	most	dangerous	course	of	action.	73	John	W.	O’Daniel,	“Report	of	U.S.	Special	Mission	to	Indochina,”	February	5,	1954,	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	Section	B,	Subpart	3(b),	252.	74	O’Daniel,	“Report	of	U.S.	Special	Mission	to	Indochina,”	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	Section	B,	Subpart	3(b),	246-258.	
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operations	in	WWII	and	being	transferred	to	a	staff	position,	Williams	was	able	to	perform	at	a	high	enough	level	of	excellence	that	he	was	later	able	to	secure	a	promotion	back	to	a	general	officer	rank.	When	he	took	over	MAAG	Vietnam	from	O’Daniel	in	1955,	the	entire	Military	Intervention	in	Vietnam	was	at	a	critical	juncture.	In	his	book,	Masters	of	War,	acclaimed	Professor	Robert	Buzzanco	stated,	“[Lieutenant	General]	Williams	ignored	both	[President]	Diem’s	repressive	ways	and	the	need	to	train	the	southern	Vietnamese	army	to	fight	a	guerrilla	war.	With	U.S.	acquiescence,	Diem	organized	his	army	not	to	fight	the	Communist	enemy	so	much	as	to	maintain	his	own	authority.”75	Williams	commented	in	an	interview	in	1964	about	how	good	his	relationship	was	with	Diem	and	how	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	Army	(ARVN)	was	organized	based	on	the	desires	of	Vietnamese	general	officers,	and	not	the	United	States’	military	leadership.76	In	this	interview,	in	addition	to	other	sources,	Williams	cannot	help	but	come	across	as	incredibly	naïve	in	that	he	fails	to	recognize	that	Diem’s	regime	was	corrupt,	or	that	the	Vietnamese	general	officers	might	have	an	ulterior	motive	for	the	organization	of	the	ARVN	in	supporting	Diem’s	powerbase.	The	organization	decided	on	was	a	division-based	army,	which	is	a	structure	that	is	based	on	a	larger	movement	of	soldiers,	15-20,000,	and	equipment.	It	is	a	structure	that	is	based	on	force	versus	force,	or	in	the	language	of	international	relations	—	a	state	versus	state	conflict.	As	historian	Joseph	Buttinger,	pointed	out,	“Organized	under	American	direction	on	a	division	instead	of	in	small	mobile	units,	and	equipped	for	the	task	of	holding	off	an	invasion	from	the	North,	the	army	was	technically	unprepared	to	counter	insurgency.”77	Williams,	while	stating	that	he	was	following	the	guidance	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	military	leaders,	was	criticized	in	a	report	written	by	a	contractor	based	on	the	question	of	how	the	United	States	could	be	victorious	in	so	many	battles	but	ultimately	be																																																									
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defeated	in	the	overall	war.	The	reported	stated,	“That	concentration	on	the	conventional	approach	[an	organization	around	divisions]	to	security	was	objected	to	by	both	the	South	Vietnamese	military	and	the	United	States	Embassy.”78	Brigadier	General	James	Collins,	writing	on	the	training	of	ARVN	in	The	
Development	and	Training	of	the	South	Vietnamese	Army,	commented:	“In	organizing	and	training	the	South	Vietnamese	Army,	the	United	States	relied	heavily	on	its	recent	experience	in	South	Korea.	The	similarity	between	the	Vietnamese	situation	of	1954	and	the	Korean	situation	of	1950	prompted	the	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	in	Vietnam	to	concentrate	on	developing	a	South	Vietnamese	force	capable	of	meeting	an	overt	invasion	from	North	Vietnam.”79	This	tends	to	be	the	trend	for	many	militaries,	and	the	United	States	Army	is	no	exception	in	training	for	the	next	war	based	on	the	last	war.	When	Williams	took	command	of	MAAG	Vietnam	in	1955,	the	Korean	War	was	fresh	in	the	minds	of	most	in	the	United	States,	and	especially	with	respect	to	his	own	most	recent	operational	time	as	a	division	commander	of	the	25th	Infantry	Division	in	the	Korean	War.	As	military	historian,	Max	Boot,	stated,	“A	veteran	of	the	Korean	War,	Williams	worried	primarily	about	a	conventional	invasion	across	the	DMZ…The	army	that	he	was	building	was	ill	equipped	to	handle	the	guerrilla	threat	that	South	Vietnam	would	soon	face.”80	However,	ultimately	the	“American	military	and	civilian	observers	in	the	field	had	no	trouble	at	all	in	finding	out	why	the	armed	forces	of	the	Diem	regime	failed	so	conspicuously	in	fighting	the	Vietcong	guerrillas.	It	needed	no	military	
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expert	to	see	that	the	army	had	been	trained	for	the	wrong	kind	of	war.”81	Williams	and	MAAG	Vietnam,	along	with	the	political	and	military	leadership	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam,	had	been	training,	to	use	Bradley’s	words,	for	the	“wrong	war,	at	the	wrong	place,	at	the	wrong	time,	and	with	the	wrong	enemy.”82	The	war	in	South	Vietnam	was	a	counterinsurgency	war,	being	fought	in	the	south,	in	hearts	and	minds	of	villages	and	highlands,	and	by	the	time	it	was	discovered	to	be	a	mistake	it	was	too	late.	“While	the	threat	of	an	external	aggression	was	real,	it	was	not	until	1959	that	the	internal	subversion	and	insurgency	openly	supported	by	the	north	was	recognized	as	the	major	threat	and	that	a	strong	effort	to	give	South	Vietnam	a	counterinsurgency	capability	began.”83	The	United	States	had	failed	before	its	soldiers	were	committed	to	combat.	Conclusion	Observing	the	breadth	of	history,	from	the	waning	days	of	WWII	through	to	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	Resolution,	and	knowing	what	would	happen	to	the	United	States	over	the	course	of	the	next	decades	to	a	generation	of	service	members,	their	families,	and	communities,	one	cannot	help	but	be	pressed	with	feelings	of	awe	and	frustration.	Awe	with	reference	to	the	sacrifices	that	were	made:	frustration	at	the	numerous	failures,	large	and	small,	that	no	one	of	substance,	at	any	juncture,	asked	aloud,	“What	are	we	doing?”	or	“What	if	everything	we	have	assumed	is	wrong?”	There	seems	to	have	been	an	almost	blind	and	continuous	miscalculation,	an	underlying	inability	to	assess	and	reassess	what	the	long-term	goals	and	ramifications	were	of	continuing	the	Military	Assistance	mission	and	then	following	that,	the	Military	Support	mission	in	Vietnam.	Eventually,	after	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	resolution	and	the	buildup	of	troops	in	Vietnam,	the	United	States	settled	on	a	strategy	for	winning	over	the	Vietnamese	people.	The	program	was	called	Civil	Operations	and	Revolutionary	Development	Support	(CORDS)	and	worked	well	for	a	while,	but	in	the	end,	it	was	as	Robert	Komer,	the																																																									
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first	leader	of	the	CORDS	program,	who	observed,	“its	failure	to	have	greater	effect	on	the	overall	Vietnam	situation	to	too	little,	too	late.”84	For	his	doctoral	dissertation,	retired	Lieutenant	General,	and	previous	National	Security	Advisor,	H.R.	McMaster	wrote	what	became	the	book	
Dereliction	of	Duty.	It	has	been	popularized	that	the	Joint	Chiefs	failed	to	confront	their	civilian,	political	leaders	when	they	saw	that	the	strategy	was	not	working	in	Vietnam.	The	true	failure	of	Vietnam	can	be	extrapolated	from	the	experience	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	a	decade	before	the	events	of	Dereliction	of	
Duty,	and	the	lack	of	securing	a	clearly	defined	political	objective	—	one	that	would	allow	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	to	both	project	power	and	strengthen	international	cooperation.	This	inability	to	define	an	end	state	for	the	Vietnam	Military	Assistance	mission	was	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	partnership	options	that	existed	for	stable	governance.	The	constant	dependency	by	the	United	States	on	President	Diem,	further	showed	that	Roger	Makins,	the	United	Kingdom’s	ambassador	to	the	United	States	at	this	time,	was	correct	in	his	assessment	that	United	States	has	a	consistent	desire	to	have	“their	man”	in	power.85	Another	important	lesson	learned	from	the	actions	in	Vietnam	is	that	United	States	Armed	Forces	can	have	a	relatively	successful	security	force	assistance	program,	followed	by	a	good	Advise	and	Assist	effort,	even	coupling	it	with	a	hearts	and	minds	program	like	CORDS,	winning	every	battle	but	still	losing	the	war.	Ultimately,	the	Vietnamese	people	voted	with	their	support,	the	support	of	the	security	structure	that	would	keep	them	safe.	The	United	States,	as	some	have	argued,	has	been	thought	to	have	lost	the	Vietnam	War	domestically	—	in	newspapers,	town	halls,	and	college	campuses	—	before	the	political	will	escalated	to	pressure	Congress	and	the	rest	of	the	United	States	Government	to	stop	the	Vietnam	War.	This	case	shows,	however,	that	the	Vietnam	War	had	been	
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lost	at	the	very	beginning	by	leaders	who	failed	to	understand	the	political	goals	of	military	action,	and	were	unable,	or	unwilling,	to	question	and	reassess	whether	their	military	strategy	was	meeting	any	political	objective	at	all.	The	Military	Assistance	mission	was	a	microcosm	of	this	entire	endeavor,	and	given	its	relatively	small	size,	would	have	been	far	easier	to	perceive	where	there	were	serious	strategic	shortfalls.	Had	this	effort	been	made,	perhaps	a	different	result	would	have	been	possible,	were	it	possible	to	re-make	history.
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Chapter	6	In	Summation:	Military	Assistance	in	the	Context	of	Warfare	and	International	Relations		This	project	began	with	the	goal	of	understanding	what	concepts	of	international	relations,	both	the	discipline	and	the	phenomenon,	could	contribute	to	a	successful	Military	Assistance	mission	and	as	in	all	projects	of	this	magnitude,	it	has	evolved	into	something	similar	and	yet,	slightly	different	from	its	intended	goals.	In	one	sense,	the	consistency	between	the	beginning	of	the	project	and	its	completion	has	been	that	goal	to	understand	the	components	of	a	successful	Military	Assistance	mission,	namely:	discovering,	understanding,	and	appreciating	the	necessity	for	political	objectives	in	any	form	of	Military	Intervention,	including	Military	Assistance.	More	specifically	to	Military	Assistance	is	the	crucial	component	of	a	partnership	between	supporting	and	recipient	nations	that	is	of	good	faith.	In	another	sense,	the	method	and	process	by	which	the	conclusions	were	made	were	vastly	different	than	those	at	the	project’s	beginning.	Initially,	the	idea	was	to	compare	the	Military	Assistance	done	during	the	height	of	the	British	Empire,	when	the	British	Army	trained	and	developed	foreign	security	forces	in	India,	the	Caribbean,	Africa,	and	everywhere	the	Union	Jack	flew,	with	the	efforts	of	the	United	States	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	to	train	and	develop	their	respective	indigenous	forces.	The	challenge	with	this	approach	was	that	areas	in	which	the	British	Empire	was	training	and	developing	foreign	security	forces	were	colonies	in	some	form,	and	thus	regarded	by	the	Government	in	London	as	possessions.	In	contrast,	the	United	States	has	struggled	mightily	to	assist	the	development	of	governance	and	security	forces	on	all	levels	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	trying	to	respect	each	county’s	sovereignty,	but	in	many	cases	failing	to	appreciate	local	customs	or	traditions	that	directly	affected	the	abilities	of	the	government	to	govern	in	those	countries.	These	efforts	were	attempts	to	impose	some	hybrid	of	Western	democracy	on	peoples	who	had	little	history	or	connection	to	that	form	of	governance,	while	at	the	same	time	being	cultures	with	long	traditions	of	honor	and	justice.	This	is	a	critical	point	as	it	relates	to	
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Military	Assistance,	because	ultimately	the	British	Empire	could	impose	its	will	and	methods	on	foreign	security	forces,	due	to	those	forces	being	part	of	the	Empire,	and	the	Royal	Army	along	with	the	Government	in	London	considering	and	relating	to	them	as	such.	However,	the	United	States	had	to	rely	on	relationships	and	influence	in	its	experiences	with	Military	Assistance,	while	the	foreign	security	forces	simply	looked	to	the	United	States	as	a	supermarket	of	resources.	Though	the	United	States	is	often	considered	an	empire,	and	many	times	referred	to	pejoratively	as	a	colonial	power	or	an	imperial	republic,	there	is	minimal	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	United	States	has	operated	as	a	traditional	colonial	power	post-WWII.	Put	more	bluntly,	if	the	United	States	is	a	colonial	power,	it	is	without	a	doubt	the	most	incompetent	colonial	power	in	the	history	of	the	world.	Though	there	can	be	no	question	that	the	United	States	has	used	its	power	and	influence	to	further	its	interests,	as	any	nation	state	does,	the	number	of	setbacks	that	have	occurred	with	client	states	such	as	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	suggest	an	ongoing	effort	by	the	United	States	to	respect	other	nations’	sovereignty	and	long-term	independence.	With	reference	to	Military	Assistance,	the	United	States’	challenges	in	training	and	developing	forces	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	were	compounded	by	Army	doctrine.	The	doctrine	at	that	time	emphasized	large,	unit	maneuvers,	and	very	little	in	the	realm	of	Advise	and	Assist	or	Security	Force	Assistance.	Indeed,	much	of	the	thinking	in	this	area	was	done	in	2006	during	the	development	of	Field	Manual	3-24,	the	United	States	Army’s	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual,	which	concluded	that	training	foreign	security	forces	was	a	critical	method	for	increased	local	security.	Although	the	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual	adjusted	military	thinking	at	a	tactical	level,	it	did	not	include,	nor	was	it	appropriate	to	include,	a	reassessment	of	the	political	dynamics	and	Grand	Strategy	that	led	to	the	broad	failures	in	combatting	the	Iraqi	Insurgency.	
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This	leads	to	an	addition	crucial	point	that	is	often	confused	by	political	leaders:1	Military	Assistance	is	not	a	strategy,	but	a	tool	within	the	broad	array	of	policy	and	even	military	options	for	policymakers	to	employ	to	reach	their	political	goals,	ideally	in	order	to	pursue	a	grand	strategy.	This	confusion	tends	to	be	due	to	the	lack	of	understanding	about	the	nature	of	strategy	as	a	general	concept	within	the	political	leadership	in	general,	as	this	group	is	far	more	concerned	with	immediate	needs	and	concerns,	as	opposed	to	long-term	thinking	and	planning.	The	challenge	with	this	misunderstanding,	however,	is	that	if	Military	Assistance	is	incorrectly	viewed	as	a	strategy,	then	it	may	be	considered	a	comprehensive	solution	to	an	overall	conflict,	which	is	unlikely	at	best	and	very	dangerous	at	worst.	Military	Intervention	of	any	sort	should	not	be	considered	a	strategy,	and	to	do	so	would	seem	to	continue	that	misunderstanding	despite	Professor	Sir	Freedman’s	highlighting	the	vagueness	of	the	definition	of	strategy.	Furthermore,	if	Military	Assistance	is	correctly	recognized	as	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy,	then	like	all	military	efforts,	it	must	be	linked	with	a	specific	set	of	broader	strategic	or	political	goals:	A	military	
means	to	a	political	end.	In	this	way,	it	has	a	great	deal	of	applicability	within	the	field	of	international	relations	as	a	practical	application	in	the	discipline.	These	differing	experiences	by	policymakers	can	be	seen	throughout	the	case	studies	in	this	research	project:	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	prior	to	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	resolution.	
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The	examination	of	the	case	studies	of	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	reveals	a	commonality	of	history:	that	of	colonialism	and	its	relation	to	the	Military	Assistance	provided	by	the	United	States.	At	the	same	time,	the	United	States	entered	into	these	relationships	with	each	nation	differently,	creating	an	understandable	confusion	in	relating	to	an	all-embracing	grand	strategy	or	strategic	vision	for	the	United	States	in	its	approach	to	international	relations.	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	a	uniform	approach	to	Military	Assistance,	but	the	broader	commonality	should	be	strategic	in	nature,	and	for	the	United	States,	as	a	Global	Power,	a	grand	strategy.	In	this	respect,	the	United	States	falls	woefully	short	in	its	approach	to	global	hegemony,	if	that	was	in	fact	its	goal.	Considering	itself	far	more	of	a	limited	power	—	and	failing	to	be	cognizant	of	its	perception	in	the	world	by	other	nations	—	the	United	States	pursued	relations	with	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	in	an	almost	transactional	methodology,	or	as	a	grand	strategy	of	selective	engagement,	picking	and	choosing	where	to	be	active.	By	this	means,	the	United	States	gave	a	truly	clear	understanding	of	a	long-term	strategy	neither	to	allies	nor	enemies.	The	main	difference	between	the	examples	was	the	clarity	of	the	long-term	sustainable	political	goals	the	United	States	had	with	each	country,	as	well	as	the	extent	to	which	each	nation	agreed	with	that	political	goal.	The	relationship	with	South	Korea	is	the	one	clear	exception,	though	more	by	accident	of	circumstances	than	deliberate	purpose.	The	accident,	of	course,	was	one	of	timing.	The	DPRK	and	their	allies,	the	Soviet	Union	and	People’s	Republic	of	China,	had	assumed	that	the	United	States	would	not	return	to	assist	the	Republic	of	Korea,	after	all	but	abandoning	the	peninsula	a	few	months	prior.	President	Truman	was	forced	from	a	domestic	political	perspective	to	pursue	war	and	resist	the	aggression	from	the	DPRK,	although	domestically	challenged	by	the	general	perception	of	having	“lost”	China,	and	having	developed	the	cornerstone	of	the	post-WWII	American	Grand	Strategy	of	containment,	a	policy	specifically	focused	on	communism.	The	accidental	timing	also	helped	to	create	the	deep	relationship	between	the	ROK	Army	and	KMAG,	even	enabling	the	KATUSA	program	into	existence.	Although	the	Military	Assistance	mission	had	already	been	underway	in	the	ROK,	this	timing	allowed	for	a	designed	effort	to	pursue	a	Military	Assistance	mission	that	
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formed	the	foundational	basis	for	the	strategic	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	for	years	to	come.	That	strategic	relationship,	together	with	the	strategic	relationship	with	the	Japanese,	formed	the	basis	of	the	United	States’	influence	in	Asia.	While	there	was	an	underlying	dependence	on	the	United	States	by	the	Republic	of	Korea,	much	like	most	client-based	relationships,	there	still	existed	a	sincere	perception	of	indebtedness	by	the	South	Korean	people	to	the	United	States,	for	the	American	servicemen	who	served	and	sacrificed	for	the	freedom	of	the	South	Korean	people.	In	addition,	the	relationship	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	with	those	providing	Military	Assistance	was	successful	due	to	the	nature	of	the	Korean	War,	and	to	postponing	any	long-term	political	concerns	due	to	the	necessity	of	survival.	These	“smaller”	successes	built	the	foundation	of	the	long-term	successful	strategic	alliance	and	Military	Assistance	relationship	enjoyed	by	the	United	States	and	the	Republic	of	Korea.	While	the	timing	of	the	Korean	War	and	the	political	circumstances	that	forced	President	Truman	into	the	conflict	may	have	seemed	happenstance,	those	circumstances	could	not	have	developed	into	an	actual	success	had	it	not	been	for	the	important	dynamics	that	were	unique	to	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	Republic	of	Korea.	One	of	the	most	important	dynamics	was	a	clear	understanding	of	the	political	goals	of	the	relationship,	namely,	to	resist	the	aggression	of	the	DPRK,	which	also	fit	well	within	the	American	Grand	Strategy	of	containment,	preventing	a	global	spread	of	communism.	Although	the	goals	of	the	United	States	with	respect	to	its	Grand	Strategy	were	clear	in	the	case	of	Korea,	Vietnam	offered	a	muddling	effect	of	the	domino	theory	concept.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	Republic	of	Korea,	Vietnam	provided	few	or	no	examples	of	a	successful	relationship,	either	sustainable	or	strategic,	related	to	Military	Assistance.	As	the	case	study	explores,	the	relationship	misfired	from	the	beginning,	as	the	United	States	misunderstood	the	anti-colonial	sentiments	in	Vietnam,	allowing	the	French	to	frame	the	conflict	as	an	anti-communism	endeavor,	rather	than	a	desire	by	the	Vietnamese	to	be	a	free	people,	a	policy	the	United	States	fervently	supported.	The	failure	was	also	due	to	a	poor	broader	strategic	understanding	of	the	United	States,	one	that	gripped	its	international	
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relations	for	decades:	the	domino	theory	—	a	different	manifestation	of	the	Grand	Strategy	of	containment.	This	conceptualization	would	eventually	(and	similarly)	place	the	United	States	on	an	unstable	strategic	footing.	Rather	than	following	the	Truman	Doctrine	of	containment,	with	clear	limitations	on	how	far	the	United	States	would	extend	itself,	the	United	States	allowed	the	Vietnam	conflict	to	occupy	more	and	more	of	its	time	and	resources.	The	origins	of	the	United	States’	involvement	in	Vietnam	were	such	that	unless	a	dramatic	and	widespread	reevaluation	of	the	original	assumptions	had	changed,	there	was	little	possibility	of	any	other	outcome.	The	inability	of	the	United	States	to	find	a	legitimate	partner	and	develop	a	set,	or	even	a	single,	clear	political	goal	created	a	disconnect	between	the	operations	in	Vietnam	and	the	Grand	Strategy	being	pursued	by	the	United	States.	In	this	case,	Military	Assistance	was	unable	to	truly	contribute	positively	to	the	overall	mission	due	to	the	inherent	challenges	evident	in	the	mission	itself.	Many	of	lessons	learned	by	the	United	States,	from	both	military	and	political	aspects,	failed	to	take	hold,	and	inevitably	the	United	States	repeated	numerous	mistakes.	Many	policy	leaders	who	worked	in	government	during	the	years	of	the	Vietnam	conflict	continued	in	public	service,	and	some	evolved	into	a	group	of	fervent	anti-communists	known	as	the	Neoconservatives.	They	recognized	that	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	communist	system	upon	which	it	survived	were	crumbling	at	its	foundation,	and	this	group	came	to	believe	that	a	little	external	pressure	was	all	it	would	take	to	bring	down	that	house	of	cards.	As	many	of	them	came	into	power	during	the	presidency	of	George	W.	Bush,	their	understanding	of	the	fall	of	communism,	joined	with	their	belief	in	the	domino	theory	of	Vietnam,	made	for	a	dangerous	combination	applied	to	the	Middle	East,	where	they	sought	to	spread	democracy	through	a	strategy	of	reverse	domino	theory,	with	disastrous	results.	Ultimately,	the	failure	of	Vietnam	and	the	domino	theory	is	the	same	as	reverse	domino	theory	—	an	external	pressure	or	actor	cannot	bring	down,	or	build	up,	a	nation	state	with	a	predictable	end	state	because	any	external	actor	may	create	unforeseen	factors	that	can	affect	a	positive	outcome	for	all.	In	fairness,	however,	this	concept	could	be	an	entirely	new	dissertation	topic	in	and	of	itself.	
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New	Areas	for	Research	As	in	all	research	studies,	a	few	answers	always	result	in	more	questions	and	this	one	is	no	different.	Although	the	focus	of	this	study	has	always	been	on	Military	Assistance,	and	the	research	aimed	to	avoid	involving	the	experience	of	Military	Aid,	there	is	a	distinctive	linkage	between	the	two.	An	area	in	need	of	further	exploration	is	an	understanding	about	the	point	of	the	convergence	between	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Aid.	This	is	due	to	the	practical	reality	that	many	American-	and	NATO-based	tactics	are	directly	tied	to	the	equipment	being	used.	In	addition,	there	is	a	need	to	explore	the	instances	of	Military	Assistance	that	have	been	implemented	to	reduce	a	recipient	nation’s	dependence	on	Military	Aid.	Such	objectives	may	have	been	continued	influence	and/or	the	continuation	of	a	domestic,	industrial	base,	among	others.	On	a	more	conceptual	level,	this	research	project	has	shown	how	some	of	the	factors	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	takes	for	granted	may	be	the	reasons	for	so	much	concern	or	failure	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance.	Some	years	ago,	Peruvian	author	Hernando	de	Soto	published	The	Mystery	of	Capital:	Why	
Capitalism	Triumphs	in	the	West	and	Fails	Everywhere	Else.	This	book	detailed	a	theory	that	the	reason	capitalism	was	successful	in	the	West	was	due	to	there	being	a	recognized	and	minimally	corrupted	manner	of	acknowledging	property	rights,	allowing	anyone	to	be	recognized	owners	of	property.	Alternatively,	in	countries	where	there	was	little	or	no	proof	of	ownership,	the	poor	were	unable	to	claim	assets	that	may	have	existed	in	their	families	for	generations.	When	capitalist	systems	were	introduced	in	these	societies,	they	failed	for	the	most	part	because	only	those	with	recognized	ownership	rights	could	participate.	Essentially,	this	occurred	because	no	one	thought	to	question	whether	the	very	foundational	principles	of	the	free	flow	of	capital	was	in	place	for	all	to	experience.	The	point	in	relation	to	this	study	is	that	there	are	many	underlying	factors	of	a	Western-style	democracy	that	are	taken	for	granted,	that	are	part	of	the	fabric	of	democracy,	and	that	should	be	examined.	This	is	especially	true	where	it	pertains	to	security	and	the	military	where,	by	and	large,	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	is	given	to	others.	
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One	of	democracy’s	founding	principles	with	reference	to	its	military	is	civilian	authority	of	the	military.	The	United	States	is	truly	unique	in	the	world	in	that	it	has	never	experienced	a	military	coup,	as	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	as	an	institution,	relies	on	the	political	leaders	to	understand	and	appreciate	the	support	necessary	to	conduct	military	operations.	This	research	project	has	discussed	at	length	how	one	of	the	most	sacred	values	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	civilian	control	and	oversight,	is	a	principle	neither	communicated	nor	developed	as	a	value	of	Military	Assistance	in	a	clear,	consistent	manner.	Civilian	control	of	the	military	should	be	explored	from	the	perspective	of	the	military,	as	it	is	a	cornerstone	of	sustainable,	long-term	security	for	a	nation.	Another	impression	that	came	out	of	this	research	project	and	the	review	of	literature	is	that	much	of	the	strategic	thinking	about	the	contest	and	competition	with	Communism	may	be	compared	to	that	of	the	War	on	Terror.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1:	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy,	the	domino	theory	was	popularized	during	the	Cold	War	as	a	method	to	prevent	the	spread	of	Communism.	Similarly,	the	reverse	domino	theory	developed	from	Kant’s	theory	about	democracies	not	attacking	one	another.	In	this	regard,	there	has	been	little	change	in	the	strategic	approach	to	the	War	on	Terror	as	it	relates	to	the	Cold	War.	In	addition,	the	language	used	is	very	similar	when	discussing	the	War	on	Terror	and	the	Cold	War.	It	could	be	argued	that	this	has	much	to	do	with	the	actors	in	the	United	States’	national	security	apparatus,	whether	they	are	Democrat	or	Republican,	liberal	or	conservative.	Furthermore,	this	may	be	due	to	whether	their	careers	started	during	the	Cold	War	or	whether	they	were	educated,	or	mentored,	by	those	who	were	involved	in	policy-making	at	that	time.	Either	way,	the	similarity	of	language	begs	for	further	insight	and	research.	Lastly,	an	area	in	which	further	research	is	clearly	needed	is	that	of	international	relations	political	theory	as	it	relates	to	Military	Assistance.	This	research	project	was	not	intended	to	be	an	international	relations	theory	project;	however,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	applicable	international	relations	theory	left	to	explore.	Having	only	reviewed	and	interacted	with	the	major	schools	of	international	relations	theory,	it	has	become	clear	that	this	entire	topic	could	and	
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should	be	the	subject	of	a	research	project	of	its	own,	one	that	encompasses	international	relations	theory	and	security	sector	reform.	Conclusion	In	conclusion,	this	research	project	gives	evidence	of	the	following:	
• Military	Assistance,	while	not	a	strategy,	is	a	useful	tool	for	policymakers;		
• Like	other	tools	of	military	power,	it	must	be	linked	with	a	broader	strategy	and	ideally,	a	grand	strategy;		
• As	simple	as	the	concept	may	seem,	it	is	incredibly	hard,	resulting	in	the	United	States	failing	far	more	than	it	has	succeeded.		The	resolution	of	conflict	is	immensely	complicated,	and	the	case	studies	of	this	research	project	portray	only	certain	aspects	of	some	of	those	complications.	The	creation	of	those	complications	is	due	to	limited	warfare.	There	has	come	to	be	a	need	for	limited	warfare	with	respect	to	international	law	and	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	War.	In	a	modern	context,	specifically	with	respect	to	nuclear	war,	limited	warfare	has	been	the	standard	of	the	United	States	since	Truman	fired	MacArthur	for	communicating	contrary	policy	about	the	use	of	nuclear	weapons	during	the	Korean	War.	Once	the	decision	has	been	made	to	operate	a	conflict	with	limitations,	options	for	the	conduct	of	that	conflict	and	its	conclusion	became	limited	as	well.	Under	the	“Pottery	Barn	rule”	for	nation	states	where	Secretary	of	State	Colin	Powell	famously	stated	that	“if	you	break	it	[Iraq]	you	own	it,”2	Military	Assistance	becomes	a	tool	that	should	naturally	be	considered	as	a	practical	option	for	nation	building.	While	the	nature	of	warfare	has	not	changed	from	the	Clausewitz-principled	idea	of	the	imposition	of	political	will	through	violence,3	the	speed	at	which	war	and	peace	develop	has	been	changing	the	character	of	war	itself.	The	order	and	manner	by	which	conclusions	of	warfare	are	imposed	must	be	being	acted	upon																																																									
2	William	Safire,	“It	You	Break	It…,”	The	New	York	Times	Magazine,	October	17,	2004,	accessed	July	31,	2018,	https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/if-you-break-it.html.	3	Carl	von	Clausewitz,	On	War,	trans.	J.	J.	Graham,	revised	by	F.	N.	Maude	(Hertfordshire,	UK:	Wordsworth	Editions	Ltd,	1997),	11-14	and	20-21.	
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and	pursued	at	the	same	time	and	in	the	same	aggressive	manner	as	the	war	itself	for	the	peace	to	have	any	hope	of	being	sustainable.	As	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs,	General	Dunford,	stated,	“the	nature	of	war	I	wouldn’t	argue	has	changed,	but	the	character	of	war	—	highlighted	by	those	capabilities	and	functions	that	I	spoke	about	earlier	and	what	our	peer	competitors	as	well	as	—	as	well	as	non-state	actors	would	have	—	the	character	of	war	is	actually	pretty	dynamic.”4	Given	the	dynamics	of	Military	Assistance,	there	is	an	inherent	necessity	to	secure	a	plan	to	develop	and	incorporate	all	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	prior	to	the	beginning	(or	at	very	least,	immediately	after	the	beginning)	of	a	conflict,	and	to	be	flexible	in	the	application	of	such	a	plan.	Creating	this	immediate	basis	of	sustainable	security	can	only	help	to	solidify	the	gains	made	during	the	conflict,	as	well	as	creating	the	bond	for	both	opposing	security	forces	and	the	population.	If,	however,	the	idea	for	such	a	plan	is	considered	as	an	afterthought,	or	as	a	secondary	problem	to	the	coming	conflict,	there	will	be	an	unavoidable	and	possibly	irreparable	disconnect	between	the	conquering	military	force	and	the	development	of	a	sustainable	security	for	the	population.	While	it	could	be	argued	that	the	plan	for	what	should	happen	after	a	war	should	be	second	to	the	plan	for	the	war,	the	experience	of	Military	Assistance	post-WWII	suggests	the	opposite.	In	the	two	case	studies	in	this	research	project,	the	one	case	that	was	a	clear	success,	South	Korea,	happened	without	planning	and	under	duress,	in	the	sense	that	there	was	no	real	initial	plan	other	than	for	survival.	However,	as	the	Korean	War	progressed,	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	that	was	integrated	prior	to	the	war’s	beginning	became	more	integrated	at	every	level,	in	every	aspect	of	the	war,	and	then	after	the	war.	This	was	evident	when	South	Koreans	began	serving	in	the	United	States	Army,	so	that	Military	Assistance	became	a	main	driver	for	the	military-to-military	relationship.	The	key	was	having	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	understood	by	both	recipient	and	supporting	nations	as	
																																																								
4	Joseph	F.	Dunford,	Jr.,	“Keynote	Speech	at	the	Center	for	a	New	American	Security,”	Defense	One	National	Security	Forum,	Washington,	D.C.,	December	14,	2015.	
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integral	to	the	success	of	the	Korean	War,	and	naturally	to	the	peace	that	would	follow.	Vietnam,	unfortunately,	did	not	have	such	integrated	approaches,	and	the	development	of	a	Military	Assistance	program	was	more	of	an	added	effort	once	other	options	failed.	Seeking	to	recreate	some	of	the	success	seen	in	South	Korea,	the	United	States’	Vietnam	involvement	started	as	a	Military	Assistance	mission,	and	yet	became	an	example	of	what	happens	to	a	Military	Assistance	mission	when	there	are	no	clear	set	of	political	goals,	in	addition	to	a	lack	of	a	willing	recipient	nation	that	has	a	sustainable	security	plan,	or	at	least	security	objectives.	These	efforts	seem	to	have	been	continued	in	military	operations	after	Vietnam,	as	have	the	poor	ability	of	policymakers	to	give	sufficient	policy	guidance	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	to	implement.	However,	leaders	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	must	shoulder	some	of	this	blame,	as	they	have	become	more	reluctant	to	push	back	against	their	political	leaders.	In	conclusion,	the	one	principle	that	has	become	abundantly	clear	from	this	research	project	is	that	military	operations	are	implemented	and	concluded	best	when	both	policymakers	and	military	leaders	work	together	and	challenge	each	other	constructively.	Grand	Strategy	must	be	understood	to	be	a	vision	to	which	the	entire	nation	commits	all	aspects	of	its	resources;	policymakers	and	military	leaders	are	most	successful	when	they	understand	and	support	that	vision	through	their	own	respective	endeavors.	Military	Assistance,	as	has	been	shown	in	this	research	project,	is	but	one	tool	in	pursuit	of	that	Grand	Strategy.
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